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Descartes the doctor: rationalism and its
therapies
STEVEN SHAPIN*
Abstract. During the Scientiﬁc Revolution one important gauge of the quality of reformed natural
philosophical knowledge was its ability to produce a more e ective medical practice. Indeed, it
was sometimes thought that philosophers who pretended to possess new and more potent
philosophical knowledge might display that possession in personal health and longevity. Rene 
Descartes repeatedly wrote that a better medical practice was a major aim of his philosophical
enterprise. He said that he had made important strides towards achieving that aim and, on that
basis, he o ered practical medical advice to others and advertised the expectation that, taking his
own advice, he would live a very long time. This paper describes what Cartesian medicine looked
like in practice and what that practice owed to the power of modernist Reason.
Philosophy and its medical point
There are four questions that have historically been put to philosophers and intellectuals
that, so to speak, call them to task. ‘If you’re so smart, why aren’t you good?’ That is a
Greek question, presuming that the goal of intellectual enquiry is personal virtue, and that
the presence or absence of virtue in philosophers is a legitimate test of the knowledge they
profess. ‘If you’re so smart, why aren’t you happy?’ That is a Greek question too, and a
related one: it supposes that wisdom should delight, either because it issues in a better
manner of living in the world or because its attainment fulﬁls a basic human longing.  Then
there is ‘if you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich?’. That is what has been called ‘the
American question’, though versions of it can be traced at least as far back as Francis
Bacon.  Here the presumption is that true knowledge is materially useful knowledge, and
that individual or collective wealth is a reliable sign that genuine knowledge is at your
disposal. 
* Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0533, USA. For critical
comments on earlier versions of this paper I thank Harold Cook, Peter Dear, Charles Rosenberg and the
anonymous referees for this journal.
1 For a better manner of living in the world as a legitimate test of philosophical knowledge, see e.g. A.
Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reﬂections from Plato to Foucault, Berkeley, CA, 1998; P. Hadot,
Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, (trans. M. Chase, ed. A. I. Davidson),
Oxford, 1995; and J. Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian
and Psychoanalytic Ethics, Cambridge, 1998.
2 D.N. McCloskey, If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise, Chicago, 1990.
3 All three of these ‘test-questions’ should be reasonably familiar to modern historians of ideas: the ﬁrst and
second through the work of such modern ‘virtue theorists’ as Martha Nussbaum and Alasdair MacIntyre; the
third through historical studies of science–technology relations and of the rhetoric used to legitimate the place of
science in mercantile societies.132 Steven Shapin
The fourth – formally, perhaps, a version of the second and third – is none the less
distinct in its cultural framing and consequences. It is far less familiar than the ﬁrst three,
yet, I want to show, it was quite important in the early modern period as a way of
advertising and gauging the quality of philosophical knowledge. This question was ‘if
you’re so smart, how come you’re sick?’, or – a variant – ‘how come you died?’, or, less
ambitiously, ‘how come you didn’t live to a hundred-and-twenty?’.
Life-and-death matters matter. They matter to every-person and they matter to the
learned person as every-person, since even Francis Bacon and Rene  Descartes had
vulnerable and, as it disappointingly turned out, mortal bodies about which they cared a
great deal: viewed at times as instruments to their extraordinary souls, and at other times
just as everybody else views their bodies, wishing that they would be less painful, more
serviceable and more durable. That is one – blindingly obvious – reason why the ability
to prevent and cure disease, to alleviate su ering and to extend human life has recurrently
been used as a public test of the truth and power of philosophic and scientiﬁc systems, and
why the learned too might share in that public assessment. 
However, there were reasons particular to the learned classes, and more particular to the
great philosophical modernizers of the seventeenth century, why medicine mattered, even
to those who were not themselves physicians. In general terms, it was bound to matter
because of the close but contested relationship that has historically obtained between
natural philosophy and the science of medicine and, through the science, the art of
medicine. For Aristotelians and Galenists, knowledge of the hidden make-up and workings
of the human body was wholly integrated within an overall philosophy of nature. The
humours and the temperaments were just a part of the same system of elements and
qualities that allowed philosophers to explain what the natural world was made of and
why inanimate bodies moved as they did. For Aristotle, Galen and their followers
‘medicine was the philosophy of the body’, or, put another way, medicine was philosophy
in action, put to the test.  And so it remained for both Aristotelians and their critics in the
early modern period.
Ars longa vita brevis – that is Hippocratic aphorism number one – but it did not matter
how long you had to learn the art of medicine if that art was not securely founded on good
philosophical principles. Early modern Aristotelians and Galenists, on the whole,
considered that medical art was so founded, and that, correcting for the complexity of the
human–environment transactions that made for individual health and disease, and for the
intractability of patients’ behaviour (even when expertly advised), medical practice did
pretty well. And the fact – as they reckoned things – that it did pretty well was powerful
testimony to the validity of medicine’s philosophical foundations as well as to individual
practitioners’ skill. 
4 Of course, other conceptions of philosophy, e.g. Epicurean and Stoic, did not run this rule over knowledge:
the purpose of philosophy was to console and to reconcile people to their inevitable fate.
5 See O. Temkin, Hippocrates in the World of Pagans and Christians, Baltimore, 1991, 8–9; idem, The Double
Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of Medicine, Baltimore 1977, 187–8.
6 There is no special epistemological problem associated with recognizing therapeutic ‘success’ in pre-modern
medicine. From within a modernist and realist perspective, it is not di cult to identify pre-modern practices that
‘worked’ and plausible reasons that might save cherished intellectual principles when interventions ‘did notDescartes the doctor 133
However, if you were a seventeenth-century modernizing and mechanizing critic of
traditional natural philosophy, you tended to take a very di erent view of the matter. 
Aristotelian natural philosophy was no good – unintelligible, absurd, vacuous – and any
practice that was informed by that philosophy was itself likely to be no good. Claims to
medical e cacy by Aristotelians and Galenists were deemed largely bogus. Thomas
Hobbes was exceptional among the great seventeenth-century philosophical moderns in
not developing a frontal assault on the state of medical knowledge and practice, though,
to be sure, his explicit applause of the current state of medical knowledge was mainly a
rhetorical vehicle to appropriate William Harvey for the mechanical cause and to ironically
imply that the London physicians were not as Harveian as they ought rationally to be. 
In the main, the rest of the great modernizers took a very dim view of contemporary
medicine. They said that contemporary medicine was just that kind of practice and belief
that was largely false, mainly barren and, accordingly, in need of systematic reform. Only
when medicine was put on solid natural philosophical foundations would it be of genuine
use in healing, alleviating su ering and extending life. The precise nature of their
criticisms di ered, but their drift was consistent: we the moderns have reformed natural
philosophical knowledge, and a reliable sign and legitimate test of our reformed natural
philosophy will be not just a better science of medicine but a vastly more powerful system
of medical practice. Why not be your own physician when existing medicine was so faulty
and when you possessed the philosophical means for its reform?  Moreover, and perhaps
work’: see, for example, E. H. Ackerknecht, Medicine and Ethnology: Selected Essays (ed. H. H. Walser and
H. M. Koelbing), Baltimore, 1971, 120–34. When that realism is supplemented by a symbolic and cultural
framework, ‘working’ is recognized as dramatically visible – as when purgatives, emetics and carminatives
visibly, and sometimes spectacularly, ‘worked’ on the body: see C. E. Rosenberg, ‘The therapeutic revolution:
medicine, meaning, and social change in nineteenth-century America’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
(1977), 20, 485–506 (reprinted in idem, Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of Medicine
[Cambridge, 1992], 9–31); and, for sociological sensibilities towards knowledge and its e cacy, see M. J. Mulkay,
‘Knowledge and utility: implications for the sociology of knowledge’, Social Studies of Science (1977), 9, 63–80.
7 For an entry into the large secondary literature on medicine and natural philosophy in the Scientiﬁc
Revolution, see the ﬁne essay by H. J. Cook, ‘The new philosophy and medicine in seventeenth-century England’,
in D. C. Lindberg and R. S. Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientiﬁc Revolution, Cambridge, 1990, 397–436;
also idem, ‘Physicians and the new philosophy: Henry Stubbe and the virtuosi-physicians’, in R. French and A.
Wear (eds.), The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge, 1989, 246–71; T. M. Brown, ‘The
College of Physicians and the acceptance of iatro-mechanism in England, 1665–1695’, Bulletin of the History of
Medicine (1970), 44, 12–30; idem, ‘Physiology and the mechanical philosophy in mid-seventeenth-century
England’, ibid. (1977), 51, 25–54.
8 The ‘Epistle dedicatory’ to Hobbes’s ‘De corpore’ (in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (ed. Sir W.
Molesworth), 11 vols., London, 1839–45, i), referred (p. viii) to ‘the science of man’s body’ as ‘the most proﬁtable
part of natural science’, but speciﬁed that this science was ‘ﬁrst discovered’ by Harvey. That science, Hobbes
continued (p. xi), has been advanced in our times ‘by the wit and industry of physicians, the only true natural
philosophers, especially of our most learned men of the College of Physicians in London’. Hobbes had very little
to say about medicine and it is not included in his map of the branches of philosophy in Chapter 9 of Leviathan,
(ed. C. B. Macpherson), Harmondsworth, 1968 (originally published 1651), 149. For the signiﬁcance of this
omission, see Tom Sorell, ‘Hobbes’s scheme of the sciences’, in idem, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Hobbes, Cambridge, 1996, 45–61, 52–4. For scattered remarks on Hobbes’s diet and regimen of health, see A. A.
Rogow, Thomas Hobbes: Radical in the Service of Reaction, New York, 1986, 224–6.
9 Of course, as in antiquity, while those early moderns able to a ord their services did employ professional
physicians, the practice of diagnosing and treating oneself was common.134 Steven Shapin
owing to the intense individualism of modernizing philosophical culture, thinkers’ personal
states of health and the lengths of their individual lives were sometimes used to gauge the
goodness of their philosophical knowledge – both by themselves and by their supporters
and critics.
The range of medical promissory notes issued by modernizers is one of the fascinating
byways of the Scientiﬁc Revolution, though, from presentist points of view, the notes do
not make for edifying reading: they look more like testaments to human folly than to the
power of reason. Nevertheless, from an impeccably historicist point of view there are
inducements to further consider these medical promises, for they o er an intriguing and
perspicuous way of reconfronting and reframing some long-standing questions about the
relations between theory and practice, and between tradition and change in the history of
culture and of technique. What did it look like when modern philosophic reason in its
purest and most rigorous forms became its own physician?
Francis Bacon o ered wide-ranging criticisms of the state of medical science and art.
‘Medicine’, he wrote, ‘is a science which hath been…more professed than laboured, and
yet more laboured than advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in a
circle than in progression’. Unless medicine were refounded upon a puriﬁed register of
natural fact and a proper philosophy of nature, we could never hope for the e ective
treatment of disease or the prolongation of life: ‘the science of medicine, if it be destituted
and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical practice’.  
Medical practice lacked both evidential discipline and philosophical system. But were it to
achieve discipline and system, what beneﬁts might humankind expect? The ‘prolongation
of life’, Bacon wrote, is the ‘most noble’ of all the parts of medicine, and he wrote
extensively about how vast extension of human life might be achieved.  
Robert Boyle was deeply concerned with medical therapeutics throughout his life, and
his advocacy of pharmaceutical ‘speciﬁcs’ was persistently framed and rationalized in
terms of his version of corpuscular natural philosophy. ‘The physician borrows his
principles of the naturalist’, Boyle wrote, so he should borrow only the best.   If you
10 Francis Bacon, ‘The advancement of learning [Books I–II]’, in The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon,
(ed. J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath), 5 ivols., London, 1857–8, iii, 253–491, 367, 373.
11 Francis Bacon, ‘Of the dignity and advancement of learning, Book IV’, in idem, Philosophical Works, op.
cit. (10), iv, 372–404, 390; idem, ‘The history of life and death’, ibid., v, 213–335. See also Graham Rees’s
introductory essay to his edition of Bacon’s De vijs mortis: Bacon, Philosophical Studies c. 1611–c. 1619, (ed. G.
Rees), Oxford, 1996, pp. xvii–cx. For documentation of seventeenth-century English medical concern with the
prolongation of life, see C. Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660, London,
1975, 246–323.
12 Robert Boyle, ‘Usefulness of experimental natural philosophy’, in idem, The Works of the Honourable
Robert Boyle, (ed. Thomas Birch), 2nd edn., 6 vols., London, 1772, ii, 1–246, 66; see also 185–6:
it is scarce to be expected, that till men have a better knowledge of the principles of natural philosophy,…it
is hard to arrive at a more comprehensive theory of the various possible causes of diseases, and of the
contrivance and uses of the parts of the body, the method which supposes this knowledge should be other than
in many things defective, and in some erroneous.
See also ibid., 199, quoting Celsus: ‘The contemplation of nature, though it maketh not a physician, yet it ﬁts
him to learn physick.’ Boyle went on: ‘A deeper insight into nature may enable men to apply the physiological
discoveries made by it (though some more immediately, and some less directly) to the advancement andDescartes the doctor 135
understood the hidden textures of matter, you would rightly grasp how drugs worked and
how to select speciﬁc drugs that targeted particular illnesses and conditions. He supposed
that he knew that better than did the physicians, and, accordingly, that he was more
e ective than they in treating both his own and others’ diseases. For humours, substitute
corpuscular textures and mechanisms: ‘I think the physician…is to look on his patient’s
body, as an engine, that is out of order, but yet is so constituted, that, by his concurrence
with the endeavours, or rather tendencies, of the parts of the automaton itself, it may be
brought to a better state.’   It was commonly said that the Draconian laws ‘were written
in blood’; in Boyle’s view this would be more accurately said of certain Hippocratic
aphorisms, which, slavishly followed by contemporary physicians, cost the lives of
countless patients. Systematic reform in natural history and natural philosophy will allow
us to do better: ‘there may be unthought of methods found, whereby, by ways di erent
from those formerly used by physicians, a man may be much assisted in the whole manner
of ordering himself, so as to preserve health, and to foresee and prevent the approach of
many distempers’.  
Infallible demonstration: Descartes’s medical project
Descartes’s vision of the practical medical goods that would certainly be delivered to those
possessed of right philosophical reason was more clear, coherent and ambitious than that
of any other seventeenth-century intellectual modernizer. His vision was philosophically
systematic and his commitment was lifelong. The Discourse on Method of 1637 announced
that a renovated philosophy would make us ‘as it were, the lords and masters of nature’.
This mastery would, of course, be desirable ‘for the invention of innumerable devices
which would facilitate our enjoyment of the fruits of the earth and all the goods we ﬁnd
there, but also, and most importantly, for the maintenance of health’. Medicine ‘as
currently practised does not contain much of signiﬁcant use’, and most honest medical
practitioners would freely acknowledge the disproportion between what we now know and
what remains to be known. But, were medicine to be refounded on proper philosophical
principles, ‘we might free ourselves from innumerable diseases, both of the body and the
mind, and perhaps even from the inﬁrmity of old age’.   Descartes publicly committed
improvement of physick.’ Also ibid., 201, on ‘the ine ectualness of our vulgar medicines, not only Galenical, but
chymical’; and see M. Hunter, ‘Boyle versus the Galenists: a suppressed critique of seventeenth-century medical
practice and its signiﬁcance’, Medical History (1997), 41, 322–61.
13 Boyle’s therapeutic activism sat alongside considerable stress on the curative power of nature: see B. B.
Kaplan, ‘Divulging of Useful Truths in Physick’: The Medical Agenda of Robert Boyle, Baltimore, 1993,
especially Chapter 5. What Boyle called the body’s ‘strainers’ (e.g. the liver, spleen and kidneys) can alter a
medicine’s corpuscular texture or recombine it with other corpuscles, thus admitting it to certain bodily sites and
not others. Or the speciﬁc medicine might itself ‘restore the strainers to their right tone and texture’ (Boyle, op.
cit. (12), 192). Boyle was sceptical of Paracelsian and Helmontian talk of a ‘universal medicine’ (ibid., 196–7).
14 Boyle, op. cit. (12), 65, 112.
15 Rene  Descartes, Discourse on the Method, published in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (hereafter
PWD), (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stootho  and D. Murdoch), 3 vols., Cambridge, 1985–91, i, 111–51, 142–3. Note
also that Descartes claimed that medicine had the capacity to make ‘men in general wiser and more skilful’ since136 Steven Shapin
himself to achieving those ends, and even announced that he had already discovered a
method that would ‘inevitably’ lead him to such practical knowledge, unless, he added,
without evident irony, ‘prevented by the brevity of life’. The essay concluded with
Descartes’s resolution ‘to devote the rest of my life to nothing other than trying to acquire
some knowledge of nature from which we may derive rules of medicine which are more
reliable than those we have had up till now’.  
Descartes came from a medical family – his paternal and maternal grandfathers were
both physicians – and it is possible that he studied medicine at Poitiers after he had ﬁnished
at La Fle   che.   In 1645 he told the Earl of Newcastle that ‘the preservation of health has
always been the principal end of my studies, and I do not doubt that it is possible to acquire
much information about medicine which has hitherto been unknown’.   And there is much
evidence that Descartes’s theoretical and practical medical concerns did arise very early in
his philosophical career. One of his ﬁrst biographers traced Descartes’s formulation of
medical goals back to 1629, when ‘not being able to forget the End and Scope of his
Philosophy, which was only the beneﬁt of Mankind, he seriously undertook the Study of
Physick…He imagined that nothing was more capable to produce the temporal Felicity
of this World…[and] he thought it necessary to ﬁnd out some way or other to secure
Humane Body from Evils that might disturb its Health’.  
By 1630, in any event, Descartes was in earnest pursuit of a practical therapeutic system
founded on his rational reform of philosophy. In that year Marin Mersenne told Descartes
that he was su ering from the skin disease erysipelas. Descartes sympathized and told
Mersenne ‘to look after’ himself, ‘at least until I know whether it is possible to discover
a system of medicine which is founded on infallible demonstrations, which is what I am
investigating at present’.   Three months later Descartes still had not discovered such a
system, but announced to Mersenne that he was then studying chemistry and anatomy in
the hope that these fundamental studies would help ‘ﬁnd some cure for your erysipelas’.  
Nine years passed, and still no medical system based on ‘infallible demonstrations’, but
‘the mind depends so much on the temperament and disposition of the bodily organs’, so that one could imagine
a virtuous cycle in which the practitioners of reformed medicine would become more clever and, hence, capable
of making even more discoveries, which would in turn make them cleverer still. See also G. Rodis-Lewis,
Descartes: His Life and Thought (trans. J. M. Todd), Ithaca, 1998, 127–8; and Temkin, Hippocrates, op. cit. (5),
13 (for the ancient view that ‘human intelligence could be changed by diet’).
16 Descartes, Discourse, op. cit. (15), 143, 151. Descartes’s medical promises, and especially his views about
the extension of human life, are brieﬂy sketched in G. J. Gruman, A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of
Life, New York, 1977 (originally published 1966), 77–80.
17 Descartes, Discourse, op. cit. (15), 113; S. Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, Oxford, 1995,
20, 64 (generally endorsing the idea that Descartes formally studied medicine), and Rodis-Lewis, op. cit. (15), pp.
vii, ix, 1–2, 18–19; and idem, ‘Descartes’ life and the development of his philosophy’, in J. Cottingham (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, Cambridge, 1992, 21–57, 28–9 (judging it unlikely that Descartes did study
medicine and disputing traditional early datings of his medical interests).
18 Letter from Descartes to Newcastle, October 1645, in PWD iii, 275 (my emphasis); see also R. B. Carter,
Descartes’ Medical Philosophy: The Organic Solution to the Mind–Body Problem, Baltimore, 1983, 31.
19 Adrien Baillet, The Life of Monsieur Des Cartes…Translated from the French by S. R., London, 1693
(originally published 1691), 79–80.
20 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, January 1630, in PWD, iii, 17; Baillet, op. cit. (19), 81; G. A.
Lindeboom, Descartes and Medicine, Amsterdam, 1979, 43.
21 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 15 April 1630, in PWD, iii, 21.Descartes the doctor 137
Descartes was unfazed, convinced that he was on the right lines, having supplemented
theory with the dissection of many animal bodies:
I have spent much time on dissection during the last eleven years, and I doubt whether there is
any doctor who has made such detailed observations as I. But I have found nothing whose
formation seems inexplicable by natural causes. I can explain it all in detail, just as in my
Meteorology I explained the origin of a grain of salt or a crystal of snow.  
The Description of the Human Body (composed in the winter of 1647–8 and published
posthumously) began with the Delphic injunction to ‘know ourselves’. But the beneﬁts
accruing from that self-knowledge were here identiﬁed as speciﬁcally medical: ‘I believe
that we would have been able to ﬁnd many very reliable rules, both for curing illness and
for preventing it, and even for slowing down the ageing process, if only we had spent
enough e ort on getting to know the nature of our body’.   Questioned two years before
hisdeath about the Discourse’s hintsconcerning the philosophically mediated prolongation
of human life, Descartes’s conﬁdence remained unshaken: ‘it should not be doubted that
human life could be prolonged, if we knew the appropriate art. For since our knowledge
of the appropriate art enables us to increase and prolong the life of plants and such like,
why should it not be the same with man?’.   So there is Descartes’s own testimony,
repeated throughout his life and in a variety of settings, that medical prophylaxis,
therapeutics and the extension of human life were central goals – even the most cherished
goals – of his philosophical reform programme.
How did Descartes think these goals could be achieved? And what did he see as the
relationship between proper philosophy and practical healing? The Preface to the French
edition of the Principles of Philosophy (1647) introduced the celebrated metaphor of
philosophy as a tree: ‘The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches
emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal
ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals.’   This is how things should be, and,
22 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 20 February 1639, in PWD, iii, 134. On Descartes’s dissections, see also
Descartes to Mersenne, early June 1637, ibid., 59; Baillet, op. cit. (19), 80; T. S. Hall, ‘Foreword’, in Descartes,
Treatise of Man, (ed. and trans. Hall), Cambridge, Mass., 1972, pp. xii–xiii.
23 Descartes, Description of the Human Body, in PWD, i, 313–24, 314.
24 J. Cottingham (ed. and trans.), Descartes’ Conversations with Burman, Oxford, 1976, 50. Descartes refused
(ibid.) to be drawn on the question of whether ‘man was immortal before the Fall’. Although both the fact and
the explanation for Edenic immortality was much debated by Renaissance and early modern physicians,
Descartes’s judgement was that this was ‘not a question for the philosopher, but must be left to the theologians’.
Frans Burman was a twenty-year-old student who interviewed Descartes in April 1648 at the philosopher’s home
in Egmond. See also Lindeboom, op. cit. (20), 96–7. The ‘Preface’ to The Passions of the Soul noted that God
had undoubtedly provided people ‘with all things necessary…to be preserved in perfect health to an extreme old
age’: what was lacking was the knowledge of what these necessary things were: ‘Preface’ to Descartes, The
Passions of the Soul, (ed. and trans. S. Voss), Indianapolis, 1989 (originally published 1649), 7. For the editor’s
view that this ‘Preface’ was probably written by Descartes himself, see ibid., 1, n. 1.
25 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (extracts), in PWD, i, 179–291, 186. As Richard Carter puts it, for
Descartes ‘physics deals with the general body out of which particular bodies are formed; medicine deals with
particular, mortal bodies that are alive and that have souls united to them’: Carter, op. cit. (8), 31. Descartes’s
well-known stipulation – both in the Principles and in the Treatise of Man – that he was giving an account not
of real but of imaginary human bodies did not, in his estimation here, diminish its signiﬁcance for medical
practice. The characteristics he attributed to these imaginary bodies were supposed to be ‘such as to correspond
accurately with all the phenomena of nature’. And this ‘will indeed be su cient for application in ordinary life,138 Steven Shapin
following Cartesian reform, how they would be. But given the poor state of contemporary
physics, it was deemed fortunate that matters were now otherwise arranged. So in The
Passions of the Soul Descartes (or, at least, a close associate) wrote that medicine, ‘as it’s
practised today by the most learned and prudent in the art’, does not depend on physics:
‘they are content to follow the maxims or rules which long experience has taught, and are
not so scornful of human life as to rest their judgments, on which it often depends, on the
uncertain reasonings of Scholastic Philosophy’.  
In this connection Roger French has noted how Descartes was bidding to ﬁll a space in
the university curriculum then securely occupied by Aristotle’s Organon (or body of logical
writings). One of the characteristics of this space, French writes,
was that the arts course naturally led on (for those who wished to follow that path) to medicine.
Not only did the arts course generally end with one of the more biological of the Aristotelian
physical works, but the whole theory of medicine was based on the principles of Aristotle’s
natural philosophy: ‘where the philosopher ﬁnishes, there begins the physician’ was a common
doctor’s defence of his own subject.
So if Descartes was going to supplant Aristotle in the university curriculum, a Cartesian
medicine was required. It was institutionally and culturally natural for Descartes to
associate the new philosophy with a new and vastly more powerful medicine.  
Descartes’s mechanistic physiology was formally elaborated in a number of tracts – the
Discourse, the Treatise of Man (composed 1629–33), the Description of the Human Body
and The Passions of the Soul (1649). The heart powered the animal machine. Its motion
was the source of all other bodily motions, and its natural heat was the natural source of
those motions. The heat of the heart rareﬁed the blood, ‘and this alone…is the cause of
the heart’s movement’.   That is why the explanation of the heart’s motions was o ered
as the key exemplar of Descartes’s mechanical philosophy in Part V of the Discourse.  
‘The cardinal tenet’, as T. S. Hall puts it, of Cartesian physiology is the assumption that
motion is transferred from part to part by contact, and the original source of bodily motion
is the heat of the heart.   Having sketched his physiological system in the Description of
the Human Body, Descartes declared that ‘this will enable us to make better use both of
since medicine and mechanics…are directed only towards items that can be perceived with the senses’
(Descartes, Principles, 289 [Part IV, section 204]). That is to say, philosophically informed medical interventions
might work even if the philosophically posited underlying causal structures were not the real ones. Later I shall
note how Descartes came to qualify that optimism.
26 ‘Preface’ to Descartes, Passions, op. cit. (24), 7.
27 R. French, ‘Harvey in Holland: circulation and the Calvinists’, in French and Wear (eds.), op. cit. (7),
46–86, 53–4; also Baillet, op. cit. (19), 121–2, 127–8.
28 Descartes, Description, op. cit. (23), 319.
29 And also how Descartes distinguished his cardiac physiology from Harvey’s. See also Descartes, Passions,
op. cit. (24), 21–2; idem, Description, op. cit. (23), Part II. Also T. S. Hall, ‘The physiology of Descartes’, in
Descartes, Treatise, op. cit. (22), pp. xxvi–xxxiii; idem, History of General Physiology, 2 vols., Chicago, 1975,
i, 250–64; G. Hatﬁeld, ‘Descartes’ physiology and its relation to his psychology’, in J. Cottingham (ed.), op. cit.
(17), 335–70; Gaukroger, op. cit. (17), 269–76. For the physiological writings of Descartes’s major medical
disciple, the Utrecht professor of theoretical medicine Henricus Regius, see T. Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch:
Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637–1650, Carbondale, IL, 1992, Chapter 2.
30 French, op. cit. (27), 50–1; T. S. Hall, ‘First French edition: synopsis of contents’, in Descartes, Treatise,
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body and of soul and to cure or prevent the maladies of both’. And, given the signiﬁcance
of cardiac theory in Descartes’s physiology, he insisted that without accurate knowledge
of ‘the true cause of the heart’s motion’ – which he considered he now had – ‘it is
impossible to know anything which relates to the theory of medicine’.  
The gap between the theory of medicine and its practical realization in both hygiene and
therapeutics was only occasionally bridged in Descartes’s writings. That is, Descartes
rarely spelled out exactly how it was that certain dietetic practices or therapeutic
interventions worked in mechanical and corpuscular terms or how proper philosophical
principles led to new and uniquely e ective changes in medical art.   Despite this largely
unbridged gap between theory and practice, there is much evidence that Descartes thought
his philosophical achievements did put him in a position to understand and to manage his
own body better than the physicians and to o er advice to friends and colleagues that was
superior to available professional alternatives. I want ﬁrst to consider how Descartes acted
as his own physician and then to detail and interpret the range of concrete dietetic and
therapeutic advice he gave his associates.
Descartes his own physician
At least twice in his life Descartes explicitly endorsed ancient counsel that one be one’s own
physician. The wise man (the argument went), taking the advice of Apollo’s oracle, ought
indeed, after a period of time, to come to know himself better than any physician possibly
could. This is what he told the Earl of Newcastle in 1645:
I share the opinion of Tiberius, who was inclined to think that everyone over thirty had enough
experience of what was harmful or beneﬁcial to be his own doctor. Indeed it seems to me that
anybody who has any intelligence, and who is willing to pay a little attention to his health, can
better observe what is beneﬁcial to it than the most learned doctors.  
Three years later he repeated the same sentiments to Frans Burman when the young student
asked him what foods one ought to eat and how one ought to eat them. We become our
own experts on such matters: ‘So, as Tiberius Caesar said (or Cato, I think), no one who
has reached the age of thirty should need a doctor, since at that age he is quite able to know
himself through experience what is good or bad for him, and so be his own doctor.’   Here
Descartes was not apparently advertising the special virtues of his new philosophical
system; he was merely pointing out that if you were a wise and attentive man, then medical
expertise deserved no deference, and noting that he himself was such a man.
Descartes’s self-monitoring began at an early age. A sickly and delicate child, he was
born (so he later told Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia) with ‘a dry cough and a pale colour’
which he believed he inherited from his mother and which remained with him until he was
31 Descartes, Description, op. cit. (23), 316, 319.
32 The most important site of such discussion is Descartes’s late writings on the passions of the soul (to be
treated below).
33 Letter from Descartes to Newcastle, October 1645, in PWD, iii, 275–6.
34 Descartes, Conversations, op. cit. (24), 51. The source is in fact Suetonius’ life of Tiberius. See also Baillet,
op. cit. (19), 260 (who put Descartes’s age at 19 or 20 when he came to that opinion); Lindeboom, op. cit.
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twenty, ‘so that all the doctors who saw me up to that time gave it as their verdict that
I would die young’.   As a child and young man he was used to taking special care of
himself. At La Fle   che he was permitted to lie in bed until quite late in the morning, partly
owing to weakness, partly because he recognized the special virtue of post-waking bed-time
for deep meditations.   Descartes liked spending time in bed: in 1631 he was still getting
a solid ten hours of (dreamless) sleep a night, and he recommended his friends to do
likewise.   Deep contemplations were hard work, and he was careful to ration
philosophizing-time to just a few fully rested hours a day.  
Descartes’s already acute self-monitoring seems to have been sharpened by his mid-life
crisis, when, after turning forty, he began to notice ‘the gray hairs that are coming in a
rush’: he did not want ‘to study anything any more except the means of postponing’ old
age.   He told Constantijn Huygens that ‘I have never taken greater care in looking after
myself than I am doing at the moment’. Yet he was in an optimistic frame of mind: he had
once believed that he was built to last only thirty or forty years, but now he saw the
prospect of living ‘a hundred years or more’ if only he could produce that infallible system
of medicine he had told Mersenne about seven years before:
I think I see with certainty that if only we guard ourselves against certain errors which we are in
the habit of making in the way we live, we shall be able to reach without further inventions a
much longer and happier old age than we otherwise would. But since I need more time and more
observational data if I am to investigate everything relevant to this topic, I am now working on
a compendium of medicine, basing it partly on my reading and partly on my own reasoning. I
hope to be able to use this as a provisional means of obtaining from nature a stay of execution,
and of being better able from now on to carry out my plan.  
Mersenne said that people were worried about Descartes’s health, but Descartes told
them not to be:
35 Letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, May or June 1645, in PWD, iii, 251. His mother’s disease was
caused, he said, by ‘distress’ (de plaisirs). See also Descartes to Mersenne, 30 July 1640, ibid., 148 (for the maternal
role in inheritance), and Baillet, op. cit. (19), 3–5, 260.
36 Baillet, op. cit (19), 14, 66; see also P. Dear, ‘A mechanical microcosm: bodily passions, good manners, and
Cartesian mechanism’, in C. Lawrence and S. Shapin (eds.), Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of
Natural Knowledge, Chicago, 1998, 51–82, 54–5.
37 Letter from Descartes to Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, 5 April 1631, in PWD, iii, 30; Descartes to Elizabeth,
1 September 1645, ibid., 263; Baillet, op. cit. (19), 259 (who said that Descartes commonly spent as much as twelve
hours a day in bed).
38 Letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, in PWD, iii, 227; also Baillet, op. cit. (19), 35–6:
high speculations ‘threw his mind into such violent Agitations…He wearied it out to that degree that his brain
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see M. Heyd, ‘Be Sober and Reasonable’: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, Leiden, 1995, Chapter 4, especially 116–17. For Henry More, Anne Conway and the dietetic
management of philosophical heat, see S. Shapin, ‘The philosopher and the chicken: on the dietetics of
disembodied knowledge’, in Lawrence and Shapin (eds.), op. cit. (36), 21–50, 38–40; and, for treatment of
pertinent aspects of the relationship between the passions and enthusiasm, see A. Johns, ‘The physiology
of reading and the anatomy of enthusiasm’, in O. P. Grell and A. Cunningham (eds.), Religio Medici: Medicine
and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, Aldershot, 1996, 136–70.
39 Letter from Descartes to Constantijn Huygens, 5 October 1637, in Oeuvres de Descartes (ed. C. Adam and
P. Tannery), 11 vols., Paris, 1964–76, ii, 434–5; also Baillet, op. cit. (19), 122, 258.
40 Letter from Descartes to Huygens, 4 December 1637, in PWD, iii, 76; see also Gaukroger, op. cit. (17),
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by the grace of God, during the last thirty years I have not had any illness which could properly
be called serious. Over the years I have lost that warmth of the liver which in earlier years
attracted me to the army; and I no longer profess to be anything but a coward. Moreover, I have
acquired some little knowledge of medicine, and I feel very well, and look after myself with as
much care as a rich man with gout. For these reasons, I am inclined to think that I am now further
from death than I ever was in my youth.  
Two years later he still saw physical signs that he would live a very long time: he told
Huygens that ‘my teeth are still so ﬁrm and strong that I do not think I need fear death
for another thirty years, unless it catches me unawares’.  
These claims were circulated throughout the learned community. Thus encouraged by
the man himself, at least some commentators were prepared to assess Descartes’s
philosophy by his visible success or failure in acting as his own physician. In 1637 Huygens
begged Descartes to write him just a few lines about ‘the means to live longer than we now
do’, and later valued Descartes’s judgement enough to consult him about a physician for
the Stadtholder.   And at some unknown date the visiting English philosopher Sir Kenelm
Digby told Descartes that life was too short to waste time in ‘bare speculations’: if you
really have reliable physiological knowledge, then the thing to do was to ﬁnd practical
‘ways and means to prolong’ human life. Descartes evidently replied that he already had
the matter in hand: while he (modestly) could not promise ‘to render a man immortal…
he was quite sure it was possible to lengthen out his life span to equal that of the
Patriarchs’, that is to say, up to almost a thousand years.   The belief that Descartes was
after the secret of living much longer, or even that he had already cracked that secret, was
not uncommon.   So it was a great shock to some of his friends when he died in Sweden,
aged just 54. Descartes acted as his own physician even on his deathbed. He declined the
ministrations of the Swedish court physicians, preferring his own preparation of tobacco-
ﬂavoured wine to bring up the phlegm. He resisted being bled and only submitted towards
the end, ‘in a great quantity, but to no purpose’.  
On hearing the news of Descartes’s death, his friend the Abbe  Claude Picot said that ‘he
would have sworn that it would have been impossible for Descartes to die at the age of 54,
as he did; and that, without an external (e trange   re) and violent cause as that which
deranged his machine (de re gla sa machine) in Sweden, he would have lived ﬁve hundred
years, after having found the art of living several centuries’.   Stories spread that Descartes
41 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 9 January 1637, in PWD, iii, 131; also Baillet, op. cit. (19), 23, 260.
42 Letter from Descartes to Huygens, 6 June 1639, in PWD, iii, 136.
43 Letter from Huygens to Descartes, 23 November 1637, in Oeuvres, op. cit. (39), i, 463; cf. Huygens to
Descartes, 8 September 1637, ibid., 396–7; also Lindeboom, op. cit. (20), 44, 96.
44 Reported in Pierre Des Maizeaux’s Life of St. Evremond (1728) and quoted in Descartes, Oeuvres, op. cit.
(39), xi, 671; see also Gruman, op. cit. (16), 79.
45 See Descartes, Oeuvres, op. cit. (39), xi, 670–1; Adrien Baillet, La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes, 2 vols., Paris,
1691, ii, 449–54.
46 Baillet, op. cit. (19), 252–3; idem, op. cit. (45), ii, 414–23.
47 Reported in Baillet, op. cit. (45), ii, 452–3; also Descartes, Oeuvres, op. cit. (39), ii, 671; and see Lindeboom,
op. cit. (20), 95. Note that a disease – such as what we would now call pneumonia – that was precipitated by an
alteration in regimen, or by exposure to extreme conditions, would then have been regarded as a ‘violent’ or
‘external’ cause of death. So Baillet said (op. cit. (19), 252) that Descartes’s last illness was partly caused
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had in fact been poisoned, and, if this tale were credited, then the cause would have been
external and violent indeed. But in the main it was not believed. Most commentators seem
to have been satisﬁed that he had died of a ‘ﬁebvre continue avec inﬂammation de
poulmon’, or ‘une pleuresie’, or, probably, in plain modern terms, pneumonia.   His early
death was taken, Lindeboom says, as ‘a blow at the reliability of his philosophy’. When
news of his death reached the Low Countries, a Flemish journal reported ‘that in Sweden
a fool had died who had claimed to be able to live as long as he liked’.   Queen Christina,
whose demands for philosophy lessons at ﬁve in the morning were the proximate cause of
the fatal illness, even sneered, ‘Ses oracles l’ont bien trompe  ’.  
Descartes prescribes
Throughout his adult life, Descartes o ered friends and colleagues a stream of practical
medical advice. Some of this advice was explicitly advertised to follow from his new
philosophical principles, while other advice not so advertised might nevertheless have been
informed by these principles. He did not ultimately deliver Mersenne the powerful medical
system based on ‘infallible demonstrations’, but many years after that promise Descartes
still felt himself in a position to tell Mersenne exactly how a mutual friend, Claude
Clerselier, ought to be treated for epileptic ﬁts. First, Descartes cautioned against blindly
accepting physicians’ recommendations that the patient be bled: ‘they are great ones for
bleeding in Paris, and I am afraid that when they see the beneﬁts of one blood-letting, they
will keep on with the treatment, which will greatly weaken the brain without improving
his bodily health’.  
Mersenne told him that Clerselier’s condition began with a sort of gout in the toe, and
Descartes replied that
if it is still not better, and he continues to have epileptic ﬁts, I think it would be beneﬁcial to make
an incision right to the bone in the part of the toe where the trouble began, especially if he is
known to have been injured in that area; there may be some infection still present which is the
cause of the trouble, and it needs to be driven out before a cure can be e ected.
As conﬁdent as he was of this advice, Descartes was reluctant to have it known that he was
appearing in the person of a professional physician, ‘interfering with medical consultations
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…So if you think it right to pass on my suggestion to one of his doctors, please make sure
that he is quite unaware that it comes from me’.  
In 1647 Descartes paid a call on the sickly young mathematician Blaise Pascal in Paris,
Pascal having moved there from Rouen in order to consult physicians. Descartes wanted
to speak to Pascal about the latter’s vacuum experiments, but, seeing how weak he looked,
Descartes volunteered some medical advice: a lot of bed-rest and a lot of soup (force
bouillons).   Princess Elizabeth consulted Descartes about a range of medical conditions
from the start of their correspondence in 1643. In December 1646 she wrote to Descartes
about a swelling in her hands, for which court physicians had already been consulted.
Descartes advised against accepting their remedies – above all phlebotomy – at least until
spring, ‘when the pores are more open and so the cause can be eliminated more readily’.
And should the condition persist until spring, ‘it will be easy to drive it away by taking
some gentle purgatives or refreshing broths which contain nothing but known kitchen-
herbs, and by not eating food that is too salty or spicy’. Elizabeth was further warned
against meddling with non-Galenical ‘chemical remedies’. Since their corpuscular textures
were precisely related to their physiological e ects, it was vital that such drugs be prepared
with much greater care than one could usually expect from chemists and apothecaries, ‘for
if you make the slightest change in preparing them, even when you think you are doing
your best, you can wholly change their qualities, and make them into poisons rather than
medicines’.   These drugs should be used ‘rarely and with great precautions’.   On the
other hand, there was no reason to ‘despise good remedies just because they are in common
use’: in its sorry current state medical expertise was likely to be more dangerous than
common custom.  
He was similarly concerned about the composition of mineral waters and their exact
medical e ects. The waters of Spa were said to be all right – provided that they were taken
at the right season – but the so-called miraculous spring at Hornhausen was likely to be
dangerous because of its possible chemical composition:
There are many wretched people who broadcast its virtues, and are perhaps hired by those who
hope to make a proﬁt from it. For it is certain that there is no cure for all ills; but many people
have made use of this spring, and those who have beneﬁted from it speak well of it, while no one
52 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 23 November 1646, in PWD, iii, 301; Lindeboom, op. cit. (20), 44.
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mentions the others. However that may be, the purgative quality in one of the springs, and the
white colour, softness and refreshing quality of the other, make me think that they pass through
deposits of antimony or mercury, which are both bad drugs, especially mercury. That is why I
would advise no one to drink from them. The acid and iron in the waters of Spa are much less
to be feared; and because they diminish the spleen and chase away melancholy, I value them
both.  
The dietetics of pure common sense
The advice Descartes took for himself seems to have been broadly similar to that which
he o ered others. On the whole, Descartes’s personal dietetics, regimen and therapeutics
do not appear either radical or innovative. Descartes’s dietetics were temperate in most
respects, and he was sceptical about a whole range of heroic medical therapies which
purported to do better than the healing powers of nature. Knowing yourself, and acting as
your own physician, meant – for Tiberius, Descartes and very many early moderns – that
you learned, over a long period of time, what foods agreed with you and what did not,
what order and quantity they should be taken in, what manner of living, forms of exercise,
patterns of sleeping, modes of emotional expression and restraint, and types of intellectual
stimulation were best for your individual body. If you needed medicine, then you could call
on a stock of personal experience, or even intuition, to judge what was required for your
speciﬁc condition. That is to say, learning to be a prudent and e ective gentleman meant
that you fashioned yourself physiologically as well as culturally, and that you learned how
best to manage the six ‘non-naturals’, not as a general and theoretical matter but as a
particular, personal, and practical matter.  
‘Our own experience’, Descartes told young Burman, teaches us ‘whether a food agrees
with us or not, and hence we can always learn for the future whether or not we should have
the same food again, and whether we should eat it in the same way and in the same order’.
Even when we are ill, we should let our appetites be our guide. Every wise person knew
57 Letters from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, May or June 1645, in PWD, iii, 250; 22 July 1645, in ibid., 255;
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this through experience, and it was only learned physicians who counselled otherwise:
‘perhaps if doctors would only allow people the food and drink they frequently desire
when they are ill, they would often be restored to health far more satisfactorily than they
are by means of all those unpleasant medicines’.   While Descartes himself was dietetically
temperate, he did not make a fetish of his food. He was neither gluttonous nor abstemious.
He was restrained in his consumptions, yet he was not one to fail in his obligations as a
gentleman. As Baillet wrote,
His course of Diet was always uniform. Sobriety was natural to him. He drunk little Wine, and
was sometimes a whole Month together without drinking a drop yet seeming very jocund and
pleasant at table, his frugality not burthensome to his Company. He was neither nice nor di cult
in the choice of his Victuals, and he has accustomed his Palat to every thing that was not
prejudicial to the health of the Body.  
Descartes was no ascetic: ‘He knew Nature must be supply’d’; he took moderate
exercise; he counted bodily health ‘the greatest Blessing in this life next to Virtue’; and he
systematically explored the dependence of the mind upon the body. ‘His judgment was,
that it was good always to keep the Stomach and other Viscera a doing, as we do to
Horses’, and, while he was not a vegetarian, he did seem to commend a high-ﬁbre diet, viz.
‘Roots and Fruits, which he believed more proper to prolong the Life of Man, than the
Flesh of Animals.’   Why should that which was good for the animal machine not be good
for the human machine? So he told Burman that ‘the best way of prolonging life, and the
best method of keeping to a healthy diet, is to live and eat like animals, i.e. eat as much
as we enjoy and relish, but no more’.   His ‘two grand Remedies’ were ‘his spare regular
Diet, and moderation in his Exercise’.  
Looking on the bright side of life: managing the passions
Baillet went on to say that the remedy Descartes favoured even before moderate diet and
exercise was the proper management of the emotions.   And, indeed, by far the most
pervasive medical advice met with in Descartes’s writings, and the most explicitly reﬂected-
upon advice, was the injunction to cheer up. Everyone who consulted him got the advice
to cheer up; Descartes said he took it himself, to great e ect; and he elaborated the
physiological reasons for its e cacy in great detail. Cheering up appears as a
59 Descartes, Conversations, op. cit. (24), 51.
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characteristically Cartesian remedy, and it connects Cartesian philosophical radicalism to
medical tradition in a revealing way.
In 1644 Princess Elizabeth consulted Descartes about her upset stomach. Descartes, of
course, recommended moderate diet and exercise, but especially drew her attention to the
inﬂuence of the soul on the body. Believe that you are basically healthy and you will in
general be healthy:
I know no thought more proper for preserving health than a strong conviction and ﬁrm belief that
the architecture of our bodies is so thoroughly sound that when we are well we cannot easily fall
ill except through extraordinary excess or infectious air or some other external cause.
Contrarily, fear or expectation of illness can be a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: there are ‘people
who are convinced by an astrologer or doctor that they must die at a certain time, and for
this reason alone fall ill, and frequently even die’. Descartes said that he had personally
seen that happen to several people.  
The next year, Descartes was plainly concerned about Elizabeth’s continuing health
anxieties. He told her what the remedy was; he assured her that he had taken it himself
and that it worked; and, as her philosophical master, he told her why it worked in terms
particular to his system. The therapy was ‘so far as possible to distract our imagination
and senses from [sources of distress], and when obliged by prudence to consider them to
do so with our intellect alone’. Descartes himself had ‘found by experience’ that cheering
up had ‘cured an illness almost exactly the same as hers, and perhaps even more
dangerous’. This was the ‘dry cough and pale colour’ he had inherited from his mother.
But early on he recognized and reﬂected upon his own ‘inclination to look at things from
the most favourable angle and to make my principal happiness depend upon myself alone,
and I believe that this inclination caused the indisposition, which was almost part of my
nature, gradually to disappear completely’.   Descartes, acting as his own physician and
moral counsellor, had cured himself of a condition which was, for all practical purposes,
part of his innate constitution. He had changed his nature by successive rational acts of
will.  
The way in which you could cure yourself by avoiding sadness lies at the heart of
Descartes’s physiology and of his medically consequential system for understanding the
relations between body and mind. Sadness (and its opposite, joy) – like wonder, love,
hatred and desire – was understood as a passion of the soul. The passions, for Descartes,
are those thoughts (emotions, sensations, or perceptions) ‘which are…aroused in the soul
by cerebral impressions alone, without the concurrence of its will, and therefore without
any action of the soul itself; for whatever is not an action is a passion’. Commonly,
65 Letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, 8 July 1644, in PWD, iii, 237.
66 Letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, May or June 1645, in PWD, iii, 249–51.
67 Both ancient (Galenic) and early modern medical thought did in fact accept the possibility that habit might
gradually change innate temperament; see, for example, Joubert, op. cit. (47), 43, and [Thomas Tryon], The Way
of Health, Long Life and Happiness, or, a Discourse of Temperance…, London, 1683, 19. The author of the
article on the non-naturals in the Encyclope die agreed: see Emch-De riaz, op. cit. (58), 138–9. So the proverbial
‘habit is a second nature’ can be understood to express the view that habit can give you another nature, not just
the notion that habit is almost as strong as innate endowment. For early modern Stoicism and the management
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however, the term was restricted to thoughts caused by some particular agitation of the
spirits.   The soul could be made sad by external inﬂuences. Descartes’s account of how
this happened was similar to his theory of sensation in general: the scenes and objects that
make one sad cause motions on the body’s surface – in the case of saddening visual scenes,
motions on the eye and in the optic nerve. These stimulate motions of the animal spirits
in the nerves, which motions are immediately transferred to the brain, and thence to the
cavities in which the pineal gland is delicately suspended. The consequent movement of
the gland is the cause of a sensory perception or of the emotion of sadness in the soul. The
bodily feeling of sadness is caused by the body brain soul tra c ﬂowing in the reverse
direction: the soul’s sadness is communicated via the animal spirits in the nerves to the
heart, and thence to the di erent organs and muscles involved in the total bodily experience
we call ‘feeling sad’.
Externally caused sadness imprints itself on the brain, storing up perceptions and
emotions to be retrieved as the soul wills. If the soul decides to summon up and dwell upon
sad thoughts, the whole physiological system involved in the original, externally caused
experience of sadness will again be put into play, internal causes now acting as e ectively
as the original external causes. Conversely, if the soul decides not to summon up sad
thoughts and rather to retrieve joyful thoughts, the corresponding physiological processes
will be suppressed and activated. And, of course, the soul can decide whether or not to put
itself in a position where external sources of sadness are likely to occur, say by deciding
not to read a sad book. The passions were thus open to volitional management: they were
not, as in the Stoic vision, to be denied; they were to be disciplined and rightly directed.  
Canonical history of philosophy correctly identiﬁes Descartes as the most systematic
dualist of the Scientiﬁc Revolution: the ontological distinction between soul and body in
Cartesian metaphysical writings is, of course, explicit and repeated. Descartes never
abandoned that dualism nor did he ever reﬂectively compromise it. Nevertheless, were one
so inclined, it would not be a di cult matter to infer from his actual medical practice a
quite di erent unarticulated metaphysics. It is not just that Descartes’s medicine was
psychosomatic (or somatopsychic): this is an accepted, and a plausible, thing for historians
to say about Cartesian thinking on such matters.   Its plausibility proceeds from the
intensity of the transactions Descartes’s medical practice posits between material body and
incorporeal soul. In these connections, interaction is so intense and consequential that
ontological integrity is blurred. Susan James’s recent study of the emotions in early modern
68 Letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, in PWD, iii, 270; also Descartes, Passions, op.
cit. (24), 338–9; and, for the most philosophically sensitive treatment of Descartes on the passions, S. James,
Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Oxford, 1997, 92–100. The summary
below closely follows James. See also idem, ‘Reason, the passions, and the good life’, in D. Garber and M. Ayers
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1998, ii, 1358–96; idem,
‘Explaining the passions: passions, desires, and the explanation of action’, in S. Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft
Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, London, 1998, 17–33.
69 Dear, op. cit. (36), 68–9.
70 Gaukroger (op. cit. (17), 388) interestingly suggests a shift occurring around the time of his correspondence
with Princess Elizabeth ‘from a somatopsychic account, in which the inﬂuence of bodily dispositions on the state
of the soul is stressed, to a psychosomatic account in which are stressed the e ects of the soul on bodily
dispositions’.148 Steven Shapin
philosophy is a brilliant provocation to recognize the plausibility of a case for Descartes
as anti-dualist, and a key passage merits extended quotation:
The thorough-going interconnection between body and soul therefore ensures that both changes
in our bodily states and the patterns of our own thoughts give rise to passion. Throughout our
lives, we are subject to delicately inﬂected and ever-changing emotions which direct and redirect
our actions and are a central feature of our experience. The capacity of the passions to stream
across the line between body and soul is matched by their capacity to cross the boundary around
the body. By virtue of our passions, our thoughts are enormously sensitive to the states of our
bodies, which have their own economies of normal and abnormal motions. Physical disease is
accompanied by emotional disturbance, and a multitude of transitions in the temperature and
pace of the blood coming from the various bodily organs cause a succession of passions, like
clouds. Furthermore, we are continually a ected by the world around us and respond emotionally
to other people, their gestures, conversations, the books we read, the weather, music, the
buildings we inhabit, and a thousand things besides. The fact that so many emotions pass through
our porous outer skins ensures that our emotional life is constant and various, often more so than
we realize. It serves not only to protect us from harm, but also to connect us to the material realm
beyond our bodies.
Note how, in suggesting ‘that the body thinks, and that among its thoughts are the
passions’, James naturally ﬁnds herself in the domain of health and disease, their practical
understanding and management.   The passions are systemic: having a sensation of
sadness involves the soul and all the organs of the body that might be pertinent to their
experience: the heaviness or heat of the heart, the sensation of sluggishness arising from
the composition of the blood, and the condition of the spleen. Because of the systemic
interaction between the soul and the body’s solids and ﬂuids, you could not only cure
yourself by the rational management of thought, you could also cure yourself by the
rational management of the other non-naturals. Diet mattered: aliment was the basis for
all bodily constituents, including spirits.   Airs and waters mattered, for example as they
bore upon the composition and consistency of the blood: when the blood was in a ﬁne and
thin condition, joy was a likely consequence, and when it was too thick and sluggish its
movement in the heart tended to produce sadness. Taking the Spa waters (and very
judicious phlebotomy) might achieve that thinness, while dry air rendered the blood ‘more
subtle’.   Sleeping and waking mattered: sleep allows the blood to refresh the brain
substance, making it more responsive to the movement of spirits.   And the active control
of the passions mattered a great deal. (Recall that Descartes’s theory of the passions
developed in a speciﬁcally therapeutic medical context: Elizabeth complained about her
state of health and Descartes o ered medical advice.) The passions, after all, counted as
one of the traditional non-naturals. The non-naturals were customarily identiﬁed as those
things bearing upon the condition of our bodies that indeed were under our volitional
71 James, Passion and Action, op. cit. (68), 106–8 (my emphasis); A. O. Rorty, ‘Descartes on thinking with
the body’, in Cottingham (ed.), op. cit. (17), 371–92; and Cottingham, op. cit. (1), 87–96.
72 Descartes, Treatise, op. cit. (22), 5–10, 17–19.
73 Descartes, Treatise, op. cit. (22), 70 (‘when the blood that goes into the heart is more pure and subtle and
is kindled more easily than usual, this arranges the little nerve that is there in the manner that is required to cause
the sensation of joy’), and 111 (for dry air); letter from Descartes to Princess Elizabeth, May or June 1645, in
PWD, iii, 250; Descartes, Principles, op. cit. (25), 280–1.
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control. And so Descartes, who started out by deﬁning the passions as those things that
were not volitional actions, ended up treating them in a therapeutic context in just the same
way as the Galenists – something about which you could give medical advice, expecting
that the prudent person would rationally act upon it.
Custom and reason in Descartes’s medical practice
So, if Descartes were your doctor, this is the sort of advice you would get:
* First of all, once you have got a su cient stock of experience with your own body, reﬂect
upon and trust thatexperience, and donot be led by medical experts whose knowledge of
your body is manifestly inferior to your own.
Within the terms of that general restriction, some robust sorts of advice included:
* Observe dietary moderation: be neither an ascetic nor a glutton. Go for a high-ﬁbre diet:
more vegetables than meat; avoid very spicy and salty foods. Do not drink too much.
Variety of foods is good. Soup is very good.
* On the whole, let your appetites be your guide. Your body is probably telling you
something; listen to it.
* Take exercise (and, by implication, venery) in moderation.
* Get plenty of bed-rest, and do whatever you know works best for you to secure a
dreamlesssleep.Don’tget upfrom yourbed too suddenly,and don’ttryto thinktoo hard
for long periods or at times that might interfere with your sleep.
* Don’t let yourself be browbeaten into acceding to physicians’ fashion for heroic blood-
letting in particular or for any extreme or bizarre treatments in general. If you have to be
bled to thin the blood, let it be in moderation and at the right times of year. Take great
care with newfangled drugs, especially those whose composition is uncertain or known
to be related to things that can harm people.
* And, above all, cheer up: avoid thinking about things that make you distressed; dwell
on pleasant objects and memories; look on the bright side of life.
When the rationalist rubber hit the road – as he reckoned it ought to do – this is what
Descartes’s revolution in philosophy came down to. He said that he would reform
philosophy on foundations wholly new, rejecting everything that he had been taught in the
schools, and he said that practical e ects on human health and longevity were among the
principal aims of his philosophical career. Yet the medical advice he o ered and took was
wholly recognizable as belonging to long-standing and approved traditions of regimen and
dietetics.ItisquitetruethatthemedicaladviceIhaveretrievedherederivesoverwhelmingly
from personal communications rather than from published texts, but this is just the form
in which Descartes chose to pro er practical advice. His texts as well as his informal
communications generated expectations of radically new and powerfully medical practice,
even suggesting that he already possessed elements of this practice. So it is pertinent to see
what Descartes’s practice consisted of – not as it might have been had he lived long enough
to perfect his system, but as it actually was. In his own terms, it is a legitimate question
to ask. What were the dietetics and the therapies of Reason?
In the main, it was the kind of advice you might give if you were an orthodox early
modern Galenic physician. Even the scepticism about medical expertise – which, in150 Steven Shapin
Descartes’s case, was very probably part of his proprietary challenge to scholas-
ticism – resonates with the sort of scepticism that was broadly expressed in civic circles,
and which, indeed, was elaborated by the great anti-rationalist Montaigne.   Much of what
Descartes counselled can be found in standard sixteenth- and seventeenth-century advice
manuals, and, indeed, in the early twelfth-century Salernitan verses, the Regimen Sanitatis
Salernitanum, endlessly reprinted, circulated and translated through the early modern
period and beyond: ‘Use three Physicians still; ﬁrst Doctor Quiet, Next Doctor Merry-
man, and Doctor Dyet.’   The injunctions to ‘know yourself’ and to ‘avoid excess’ were
carved on Apollo’s temple at Delphi: they are not only central to the art of hygiene; they
are its historical origins. Descartes’s free and easy attitude towards the appetites in sickness
is a version of what was known as the Rule of Celsus: the rule of no rule, the view that
a healthy man should not enslave himself to any particular rule or system, that he should
do whatever it is customary to do and subject himself to the varieties and vicissitudes of the
life that was customary for people of his sort.   The foolishness of the view that there was
one right global rule for health followed from an appreciation of constitutional
individuality that was also standard in traditional medicine: you should be your own
physician, and you should ﬁnd out what worked best for you, because no one else was just
like you. Medicine, if it worked at all, worked upon idiosyncratic individual bodies.
The dependence of bodily health upon states of mind was likewise wholly familiar from
traditional medical advice. Disease was understood to be the result of disorder and excess
of any kind, disrupting the balance of the humours, obstructing their ﬂow, and producing
putrefaction and corruption. Physiological conditions could, as a matter of course, have
psychological causes. Maintaining a healthy frame of mind was of vital importance to
bodily health, and I have already noted that the passions counted among the non-naturals
of Galenic medicine, their management understood to be as important to bodily well-being
as food, drink and exercise. Indeed, the precise physiological e ects of the passions were
75 Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, (trans. D. M. Frame), Stanford, CA,
1965 (originally published 1580–8), especially ‘Of experience’. See, for example, the similarity between
Montaigne’s view of the appetites in sickness and views Descartes expressed in his conversation with Burman:
‘Both in health and in sickness I have readily let myself follow my urgent appetites. I give great authority to my
desires and inclinations’ (ibid., 832). See also M. Brunyate, ‘Montaigne and medicine’, in K. Cameron (ed.),
Montaigne and His Age, Exeter, 1981, 27–38, and, for general remarks on the conservatism of medical practice
against the background of change in medical theory, see J. Henry, ‘Doctors and healers: popular culture and the
medical profession’, in S. Pumfrey, P. L. Rossi and M. Slawinski (eds.), Science, Culture and Popular Belief in
Renaissance Europe, Manchester, 1991, 191–221, especially 211–12: ‘the mechanical philosophy made no
signiﬁcant impact on the practice of medicine’.
76 See e.g. H. E. Sigerist, Landmarks in the History of Hygiene, London, 1956, Chapter 2. The most inﬂuential
English version in this period was Sir John Harington’s The English Mans Doctor. Or the Schoole of Salerne,
London, 1607. The quotation is from Sir John Harington, The School of Salernum: Regimen Sanitatis Salerni,
Salerno, 1957, 22. For the proverbial element in early modern medical culture, see also Henry, op. cit. (75),
198–201, and Shapin op. cit. (58).
77 For the original, see Aulus fnotelius Celsus, De medicina, (trans. W. G. Spencer), 3 vols., Cambridge,
Mass., 1960, i , 43 (Book I, i); also 57. Celsus probably lived in Tiberius’ reign, the same emperor whose opinion
that every man should be his own physician Descartes so much liked; cf. Plutarch: ‘A diet which is very exact
and precisely according to rule puts one’s body both in fear and danger’ (Plutarch, ‘Rules for the preservation
of health’, in idem, Plutarch’s Lives and Miscellanies (ed. A. H. Clough and W. W. Goodwin), 5 vols., New York,
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even identiﬁed in some popular medical texts of the sixteenth century: irritability might
show up in the composition of the blood.   The notion that a healthy body was in causal
interaction with a healthy mind was proverbial: you did not have to know Juvenal’s mens
sana in corpore sano to be exposed to a folk version of the same view, while the moral
importance of managing the passions was an article of Stoic conceptions of virtue and
gentility that were widely inﬂuential in early modern civic circles.  
Curing or enduring?
So the practical medical advice that was advertised as issuing from Descartes’s radical
reform of philosophy was not itself at all radical. Nor was Descartes’s conﬁdence
unalloyed in the ability of his rational reform to deliver the promised medical goods.
Against the general background of boasts, promises and dreams, there was an undercurrent
of doubt, resignation and reconciliation to inevitable fate. Even in the hubristic Discourse,
Descartes said that he was reluctant to ‘commit myself in the eyes of the public by making
any promise that I am not sure of fulﬁlling’.   In the Principles, he expressed conﬁdence
that he had already established true philosophical principles, but that ‘many centuries may
pass before all the truths that can be deduced from these principles are actually so
deduced’.   When, in 1639, Descartes told Mersenne that he could already explain
everything about the animal frame in detail and by natural causes, he confessed,
But for all that I do not yet know enough to be able to heal even a fever. Because I claim to know
only animal in general, which is not subject to fevers, and not yet man in particular, who is.  
Nor did Descartes neglect formally to give providence its due. Quite possibly, Father
Mersenne brought out the pious and the lugubrious side of him, but, in the same letter in
which Descartes told him that he was very well and looked forward to a long life, he also
acknowledged Divine pleasure and a traditional role of philosophy in counselling the wise
man that, as the proverb says, what can’t be cured must be endured:
Should God not grant me the knowledge to avoid the discomforts of old age, I hope he will at
least grant me a long enough life and the leisure to endure them. Yet all depends upon his
providence…One of the main points in my own ethical code is to love life without fearing
death.  
78 P. Slack, ‘Mirrors of health and treasures of poor men: the use of the vernacular medical literature of Tudor
England’, in C. Webster (ed.), Health, Medicine and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century, Cambridge, 1979,
237–73, 268.
79 A. Taylor, The Proverb, Berlin, 1985 (originally published 1931), 121–9; Dear, op. cit. (36); Baillet, op. cit.
(19), 18–19, 59 (for Descartes’s refusal to be ‘a Slave’ to passions, and how he overcame a youthful addiction to
gambling).
80 Descartes, Discourse, op. cit. (15), 151.
81 Descartes, Principles, op. cit. (25), 189.
82 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 20 February 1639, in PWD, iii, 135.
83 Letter from Descartes to Mersenne, 9 January 1639, in PWD, iii, 131. In these connections, providence and
the ‘grace of God’ were repeatedly invoked, and Descartes fell in with traditional Renaissance and early modern
medical sensibilities about the complicated relationships between, on the one hand, using one’s best e orts to
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In 1646 he told his friend Chanut that he had more success using physics to ground ethics
than to ground medicine:
Indeed I have found it easier to reach satisfactory conclusions on [moral philosophy] than on
many others concerning medicine, on which I have spent much more time. So instead of ﬁnding
ways to preserve life, I have found another, much easier and surer way, which is not to fear death.
But this does not depress me, as it commonly depresses those whose wisdom is drawn entirely
from the teaching of others, and rests on foundations which depend only on human prudence and
authority.  
Descartes had his occasional dark night of the soul, but these eruptions of resigned pathos
are a counterpoint to the medical optimism that ran through his entire philosophical
career.  
Descartes understood, or at least intermittently appreciated, the hybrid status of
medicine: as a science and as an art. If the object of medical science is body in general, the
object of medical art is this particular ailing body. That is just the distinction Descartes
recognized when he lamented to Mersenne that he really did not even know how to cure
afever.Whatworkedinandfor animaginedbody – ‘astatue, anearthen machine’ – might
not work in and for your body, which was to be understood as the result of your innate
constitution plus your total historical transactions with the environment and your history
of managing those transactions, su ering from your particular sort of fever on a cold
Monday morning in winter, living in a place with gross air.
The art (or practice) of medicine was, therefore, action under uncertainty. Just as you
must act in society without having certain knowledge of consequences, so you must eat
without knowing whether this particular food is wholesome or poisonous. Knowledge that
foods of this general kind have been good for you is not certain knowledge that this
particular dish will not kill you.   As in ethics and social conduct, so in the art of medicine:
if you must act under uncertainty, then your best guides are, indeed, custom and, one might
say, common sense. So in the Discourse Descartes wholly acknowledged that scepticism
and the demand for certainty were limited as practical matters. Since you had to act even
when absolute certainty was not attained or attainable, you had, as a general matter, to
84 Letter from Descartes to Chanut, 15 June 1646, in PWD, iii, 289; cf. Baillet, op. cit. (19), 53.
85 Cf. Gaukroger’s contention (op. cit. (17), 388) that the sentiments expressed to Chanut represent an
intellectual ‘shift’ brought about by the reﬂections on which Descartes was engaged c. 1645–6 about ‘the nature
of the substantial union of mind and body’. The Preface to The Passions of the Soul (1649) was, however, a quite
typical Cartesian expression of medical optimism.
86 This is Descartes’s own example: letter from Descartes to Hyperaspistes, August 1641, in PWD, iii, 189–90.
Roger French (op. cit. (27), 78–9) puts the point at issue well:
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In the art of medicine, there are no rules for certain knowledge: as Galen says there is no sure way of telling
a nephritic from a colic pain, nor how a medicine acts by its ‘whole substance’. As Celsus says, in the art of
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provide yourself with some maxims of prudent conduct, the ﬁrst of which was to follow
‘the laws and customs of my country’.   And this is what Descartes’s medical practice
really amounted to. After the rationalist and revolutionary smoke clears, the hubristic
modernist Descartes and the sceptical traditionalist Montaigne turn out to be as one on the
issue of medical practice. Custom is a pretty good guide. Know yourself. Avoid extremes.
Modernist philosophical ambitions and rhetorical fanfares did not ﬁnd it that easy to
shift long-standing traditions of medical practice. And the reasons why these traditions
were so durable are interestingly related to the grounds on which Descartes’s rationally
founded medical advice might enjoy whatever authority and credibility it had in his society.
Regimen and dietetics – the management of the non-naturals – were central components of
the medical art. But, looked at from another point of view, that management amounted to
a substantial part of individuals’ quotidian life and of the customs held in common by the
community or at least Descartes’s sector of it. The body of culture that told you where to
live, what to eat, when to sleep and how to control your passions was wholly integrated
into the practices of everyday living and into the everyday moral environment that allowed
actions to be reliably accounted good or bad. It was not only good for you to follow
medical advice counselling moderation; it was just good to do so. Correspondingly, your
health could be read as evidence that you had followed a virtuous course of conduct while
your disease might be understood as the upshot of intemperance and viciousness. As
Temkin sums up the Galenic hygienic tradition, ‘A healthy life is a moral obligation…
Health…becomes a responsibility and disease a matter for possible moral reﬂection’.  
That state of a airs was still ﬁrmly in place in the Renaissance and early modern period.
Popular medical texts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (and beyond) articulated
moral and social norms as they advised how to live a healthy life and how to cure disease.  
That is why those traditions of medical practice were so resistant to change: revolutionary
change in these practices would be just as di cult to achieve as social and cultural
revolution.
But, as we have seen, Descartes did not challenge the practices of traditional medical art
in any signiﬁcant way. Belonging to the domain of judgement under uncertainty, those
percepts and maxims were pretty good guides to follow until the promised system of
‘infallible demonstrations’ was secured, or, put another way, until squadrons of pigs ﬂew
past his window in tight formation. In so far as Descartes’s medical advice enjoyed local
authority, that authority must have been substantially borrowed from the same medical
tradition that, as a philosopher, he a ected to despise. We are now on stage again with
Molie   re’s Le Malade imaginaire. Previously you were to control the passion of anger
because it unbalanced the humours. Now reference to humours was deemed unintelligible:
instead you were to control the passion of anger because it had a certain e ect on the
animal spirits which, when communicated to the heart, a ected the size of its pores, which
87 Descartes, Discourse, op. cit. (15), 122.
88 O. Temkin, Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy, Ithaca, 1973, 39–40.
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morality in early modern England’, in A. M. Brandt and P. Rozin (eds.), Morality and Health, New York, 1997,
15–34, esp. 20–4; Shapin op. cit. (58).154 Steven Shapin
unbalanced the consistency of the blood.   Mechanical philosophy, like its Aristotelian and
Galenist predecessors, provided a language for talking about human beings and their
vicissitudes in relation to the rest of the universe. There were all kinds of reasons why
certain people might want such a language, and why certain people might ﬁnd a
mechanical language preferable to, even more intelligible than, alternatives.   But a unique
causal relationship to new and e ective medical interventions is not one of them.
90 For a brilliant survey of this general tendency in seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy, see A. Gabbey,
‘The mechanical philosophy and its problems: mechanical explanations, impenetrability, and perpetual motion’,
in J. C. Pitt (ed.), Change and Progress in Modern Science, Dordrecht, 1985, 9–84, especially 10–12. T. S. Hall
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35, 85; see also Hatﬁeld, op. cit. (29), 341–4; and, for overall continuities between Cartesian thought and
tradition, E. Gilson, Etudes sur le ro   le de la pense e me die vale dans la formation du syste   me carte sien, 4th edn.,
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